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1.   Introduction 
In the past decade the number of free trade agreements (FTAs) has proliferated 
rapidly. Other than ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), East Asian countries were 
relatively inactive in signing FTAs until the end of 1990s. Since 2001, however, a number 
of FTAs involving East Asian countries have been implemented or signed, including 
Singapore-New Zealand (2001), Japan-Singapore (2002), Singapore-Australia (2003), 
Singapore-U.S. (2004), Korea-Chile (2004), ASEAN-China (2005), Japan-Mexico (2005), 
Thailand-Australia (2005), Korea-Singapore (2006), and ASEAN-Korea (2006).1 Korea 
and the United Stated signed an FTA in June 2007, but it remains to be seen whether the 
U.S. Congress and the Korean National Assembly would ratify the bilateral pact. A large 
number of FTAs are currently being negotiated in East Asia, including ASEAN-Japan, 
China-Australia, and Japan-Korea. The ASEAN+3 group, consisting of the ASEAN 
countries, China, Japan, and Korea, has provided an effective mechanism for greater 
cooperation and gradual regional economic integration in East Asia. The trends in 
negotiating for new FTAs are likely to grow in East Asia.2 
Whether the growth of FTAs has a positive or negative impact on multilateral trade 
liberalization under the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been debated intensely (e.g., 
Krueger, 1999; Panagariya, 2000; Lloyd and MacLaren, 2004). 3  Since the outcome 
depends upon the choice of the objective function (e.g. economic welfare versus political 
objective), the height and structure of initial trade barriers and other variables,4 it would be 
helpful to examine the actual record. The earlier studies (e.g., World Trade Organization, 
                                                 
1 The ASEAN-Korea FTA signed in May 2006 was initially limited to trade in goods, and some 
agricultural products including rice was left out. Thailand decided not to sign the FTA because of the 
exclusion of rice. 
2 See Kawai (2004), Feridhanusetyawan (2005), and Lee and Park (2005) for more detailed discussion 
on the proliferation of FTAs in East Asia. 
3 Proponents for regional integration argue that FTAs encourage member countries to liberalize beyond 
the level committed by multilateral negotiations and that they are an effective way to promote 
economic integration (e.g., Kahler, 1995; Dee, 2007). In addition, FTAs are likely to induce dynamic 
effects that might contribute to member countries’ growth through the accumulation of physical and 
human capital, productivity growth, and accelerated domestic reforms (e.g., Ethier, 1998; Fukase and 
Winters, 2003). Opponents worry that the proliferation of FTAs is likely to undermine the multilateral 
trading system and that beneficiaries of FTAs might form a political lobby to deter further multilateral 
liberalization (e.g., Bhagwati, 1995; Srinivasan, 1998a, 1998b; Panagariya, 1999a). 
4 See, for example, Panagariya (1999b), Schiff and Winters (2003), and Lloyd and MacLaren (2004) 
for reviews on this issue. 
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1995; World Bank, 2000) suggest that the proliferation of regional integration agreements 
(RIAs) did not delay multilateral liberalization. However, Lloyd and MacLaren (2004) 
point out that after the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún in September 2003, the 
United States and the EU’s priority has shifted to the completion of bilateral and regional 
trade negotiations. Thus, the relationship between the growth of RIAs and multilateral 
liberalization might have changed. 
A number of studies have quantified the effects of various FTAs in East Asia using 
a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model (e.g., Brown et al., 2003; Dee, 2007; Lee 
et al., 2004; Park, 2006; Scollay and Gilbert, 2001; Urata and Kiyota, 2003; Zhai, 2006). 
These studies generally find: (1) most of the FTA members’ real income increases while at 
least some of non-members’ real income declines; (2) the larger the economic size of the 
FTA, the larger the aggregate gain to the members; (3) if FTAs are confined to only tariff 
liberalization for merchandize trade, the welfare gains are limited and some of the 
members are more likely to become worse off; (4) when FTAs include services trade 
liberalization and trade facilitation, the gain to each member increases and the aggregate 
loss to non-members decreases; (5) the impact of FTAs becomes greater when the model 
incorporates increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition in at least some of the 
industries; and (6) the effects of FTAs tend to become more beneficial with the model 
incorporating investment and growth effects. 
While the aggregate welfare effect of FTAs is certainly important, the sectoral 
impact could be of an even greater concern to policy makers. This is because regional 
integration might lead to a sharp contraction of output and employment in highly protected 
sectors. For example, the agricultural sectors in Japan and Korea are highly subsidized 
and shielded against foreign imports by significant tariffs and nontariff barriers. In a 
number of developing members, tariffs, industrial policy, and other government policies 
protect certain manufacturing industries from foreign competition. Since trade policy is 
often formulated from the bottom up, a modern view of national interest, such as that 
based on trade reciprocity, might encounter conflicts with established domestic interests. 
Using a dynamic global CGE model, we evaluate the effects of various free trade 
agreements involving East Asian countries, emphasizing sectoral adjustments and changes 
in the pattern of trade resulting from the formation of FTAs. The next section gives an 
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overview of the model. Section 3 provides a brief description of the baseline and policy 
scenarios, followed by assessments of computational results in section 4. The final section 
summarizes the main policy conclusions. 
 
2.   Overview of the Model 
The model used in this study, known as the LINKAGE model, is a dynamic global 
CGE model developed by van der Mensbrugghe (2005). It spans the period 2001-2015 and 
all sectors are assumed to be perfectly competitive and operate under constant returns to 
scale.5 Production in each sector is modeled by a series of nested constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) production functions, which are intended to represent the different 
substitution and complementarity relations across the various inputs in each sector. Labor 
can have three different skill levels: unskilled, skilled, and highly skilled. The first two are 
substitutable and combined in a CES aggregation function as a single labor bundle. Highly 
skilled labor is combined with capital to form a physical plus human capital bundle. 
Dynamics in this model is recursive. Population and labor supply growth are 
exogenous. Capital accumulation is based on past savings and investment. In each period 
the supply of primary factors is generally predetermined. The supply of land is assumed to 
be sensitive to the contemporaneous price of land, however. Land is assumed to be 
partially mobile across agricultural sectors. Thus rates of return are sector-specific, but 
sectoral land supply reacts to changes in relative rates of return. Some of the natural 
resource sectors also have a sector-specific factor whose contemporaneous supply is price 
sensitive. The model incorporates a vintage structure for capital that allows for adjustment 
costs. New capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors, whereas installed 
capital is only partially mobile. All else equal, countries with higher savings rates will 
have more ‘flexible’ capital since it is assumed that substitution elasticities are higher with 
new capital than with installed capital. Labor within each skill category is perfectly mobile 
across sectors. 
                                                 
5 The assumption of constant returns to scale is a simplification and generally biases downwards the 
gains from trade reform because expansion of trade provides scale efficiencies. The introduction of 
scale economies raises a number of important issues, each of which could significantly modify the 
results, but we prefer to leave out of the current study. They include the lack of data on the minimum 
efficient scale and the specification of market structure (e.g., Cournot versus Bertrand competition), the 
number of firms, conjectural variations, and whether there is free entry and exit. 
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Factor income accrues to a single representative household, which finances 
government expenditures (through direct and indirect taxes) and investment (through 
domestic savings). Domestic savings may be augmented or diminished by a net capital 
flow. In the current version of the model, the latter is exogenous in any given time period 
for each region, thereby generating a fixed current account balance. Ex ante shocks to the 
current account—e.g., a reduction in trade barriers—induces a change in the real exchange 
rate. Government fiscal balances are also fixed in each time period, and the equilibrating 
mechanism is lump-sum taxes on the representative household. For example, a reduction 
in tariff revenue is compensated by an increase in household direct taxation.  
The basic assumption on trade is that imports originating in different regions are 
imperfect substitutes (known as the Armington assumption). The model uses a nested 
demand structure. Aggregate domestic absorption by sector is allocated between domestic 
goods and a single composite import good. The latter is then allocated across region of 
origin to determine the bilateral trade flows on a sectoral basis. An analogous dual-nested 
structure is used to allocate domestic production between domestic and export markets 
using constant elasticity of transformation functions. 
The model has four trade prices incorporating four separate instruments. First, 
producers receive price PE for exported goods. Second, the FOB price, WPE, includes 
domestic export taxes or subsidies. Third, the CIF price, WPM, includes the direct costs of 
port-to-port shipping, represented by the ad valorem wedge ζ, as well as a non-monetary 
or frictional cost,6 represented by the iceberg parameter λ. Thus the relationship between 
the FOB price and the CIF price is given by 
 ( ) irrirrirrirr WPEWPM ,',,',,',,', 1 λζ+=  (1) 
where subscripts r, r', and i denote exporting region/country, importing region/country, 
and commodity, respectively. Finally, the domestic price of imports, PM, is equal to the 
CIF price, WPM, plus the ad valorem tariff (or tariff-equivalent) rate. In our model, an 
increase in irr ,',λ  represents a reduction in trade-related risk, lower administrative barriers  
                                                 
6 This type of cost is referred to as ‘iceberg’ transport cost, developed by Samuelson (1952) based on a 
concept developed earlier by von Thünen. More recently, these have been used in work by Helpman 
and Krugman (1985) and Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999). 
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to trade (e.g., customs procedures) and/or a fall in technical barrier (e.g., mutual 
recognition of product standards). In other words, trade facilitation would increase the 
value of irr ,',λ . 
Foreign capital flows (e.g., foreign direct investment: FDI) are exogenous in the 
current version. We acknowledge that endogenous treatment of FDI is very important 
when we discuss the implications of FTAs because trade and FDI are closely linked. It has 
been shown that allowing for capital to flow to countries with relatively high rates of 
return could significantly raise the gains from trade reform. In our preliminary 
investigation on the impact of APEC trade and investment liberalization, Lee and van der 
Mensbrugghe (2005) find that an addition of FDI liberalization to trade liberalization 
would significantly boost the gains to most of the APEC economies. 
Most of the data used in the model come from the GTAP database, version 6, 
which provides 2001 data on input-output, value added, final demand, bilateral trade, tax 
and subsidy data for 87 regions and 57 sectors.7 For the purpose of the present study, the 
database is aggregated into 10 regions and 26 sectors as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Regional and sectoral aggregation 
 
A.  Regional aggregation     
Country/region Corresponding economies/regions in the GTAP database    
China China and Hong Kong 
Japan Japan 
Korea Korea 
Taiwan Taiwan 
ASEAN Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, rest of  
 Southeast Asia 
Australasia Australia and New Zealand 
North America United States, Canada, Mexico 
Latin America Central America and the Caribbean, South America 
EU Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain,  
 Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
 plus the new member countries since 2004 
Rest of world All the other economies/regions   
 
                                                 
7 Dimaranan (2006) gives detailed descriptions of the GTAP database, version 6. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
B.  Sectoral aggregation     
Sector Corresponding commodities/sectors in the GTAP database    
Rice Paddy rice, processed rice 
Other grains Wheat, cereal grains n.e.s. 
Vegetables and fruits Vegetables and fruits 
Other crops Oil seeds, sugar cane and sugar beet, plant-based fibers, crops n.e.s. 
Livestock Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, animal products n.e.s.  
Natural resources forestry, minerals 
Fossil fuel Coal, oil, gas 
Food products Fishing, food products, beverages and tobacco products 
Textiles Textiles 
Apparel Wearing apparel 
Leather Leather products 
Wood products Wood products 
Paper products Paper products and publishing 
Petroleum products Petroleum and coal products 
Chemical products Chemical, rubber and plastic products 
Mineral products Non-metallic mineral products 
Iron and steel Iron and steel 
Nonferrous metal Nonferrous metal 
Metal products Fabricated metal products 
Machinery Machinery and equipment 
Electronic equipment Electronic equipment 
Motor vehicles Motor vehicles and parts 
Other transport equip. Other transportation equipment 
Other manufactures Manufactures n.e.s. 
Trade and transport Trade, sea transport, air transport, transport n.e.s. 
Services Construction, public utilities, communication, financial services,  
 other services    
Source: GTAP database, version 6. 
 
 
 
3.   The Baseline and Policy Scenarios 
3.1 The Baseline Scenario 
To evaluate alternative FTA scenarios in East Asia, we first establish a baseline, 
which shows the path of each economy in the absence of any FTAs over the period 2001-
2015. In the baseline, several key variables, including GDP growth rates, population and 
labor supply, are predetermined by the exogenous assumptions. Projections of real GDP, 
population and labor supply are broadly consistent with the World Bank’s long-term 
forecast. We assume that the trade and transport margin declines by 1 percent per annum 
in every country. The dynamics are calibrated in each country/region by imposing the 
assumption of a balanced growth path. This implies that the ratio between labor and the 
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capital/fixed-factor bundle (in efficiency units) is held constant over time.8 When policy 
scenarios are simulated, the growth of capital is endogenously determined by the saving-
investment relation. 
Several assumptions underline the calibration of productivity. Agricultural 
productivity is fixed in the baseline using results from recent empirical studies. Sectoral 
productivity in non-agricultural sectors is composed of three components: a uniform 
economywide factor that is calibrated to achieve the given GDP target, a sector-specific 
factor related to openness, and a constant shifter. The sector-specific factor intended to 
capture openness-sensitive changes in productivity, χi,t, is given by 
 
i
ti
ti
titi X
E
η
φχ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
,
,
,,  (2) 
where Ei,t is exports of commodity i, Xi,t is output of commodity i, φi,t is a shift parameter, 
and ηi is the elasticity of productivity with respect to openness. φi,t is calibrated in the 
baseline scenario so that the trade-sensitive portion of sectoral productivity is some share 
of total productivity.9  
There are four types of taxes in the model: commodity taxes, production taxes, 
income taxes and trade taxes (consisting of tariffs and export taxes). Commodity and 
production taxes are held constant throughout the simulation period. The marginal income 
tax rate adjusts to maintain a given government budget surplus or deficit. For the final 
implementation of the Uruguay Round, the tariff and export tax rates are lowered during 
the 2001-2005 period. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) that have phased 
out import quotas on textiles and apparel are also incorporated in the baseline. Finally, 
China and Taiwan’s WTO accession and the resulting reductions in their tariff rates are 
also included. 
 
                                                 
8  This involves computing in each period a measure of Harrod-neutral technical progress in the 
capital/fixed-factor bundle as a residual, given that the growth of the labor force (in efficiency units) is 
pre-determined. This is a standard calibration procedure in dynamic CGE modeling. 
9 Three main channels have been identified linking openness with productivity: imports of technology-
laden intermediate inputs (for example fertilizers in agriculture), imports of capital goods, and export 
market penetration (with the requirement to produce to a higher standard than at home to be able to 
penetrate new markets; expanding foreign markets can also lead to scale economies). Much empirical 
work is ongoing trying to identify the extent to which each one of these channels operates. At a macro 
level, there are to some extent observationally equivalent to the extent that current account balances are 
more or less exogenous. de Melo and Robinson (1990) and Dessus et al. (1999) take an approach 
similar to ours. Das et al. (2001) have explored some firm-level characteristics of export supply 
response.  
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3.2 Policy Scenarios 
To evaluate sectoral adjustments and changes in the pattern of trade resulting from 
prospective free trade agreements in East Asia, the following seven policy scenarios are 
considered: 
 
1) ASEAN-China FTA: Free trade among the ASEAN countries and China10 
 
2) ASEAN-Japan FTA: Free trade among the ASEAN countries and Japan 
 
3) ASEAN-Korea FTA: Free trade among the ASEAN countries and Korea 
 
4) China-Japan-Korea FTA: Free trade among China, Japan and Korea 
 
5) ASEAN+3: Free trade among the ASEAN countries, China, Japan and Korea 
 
6) ASEAN-EU: Free trade among the ASEAN and EU member countries 
 
7) Global trade liberalization (GTL): Complete abolition of import tariffs and export 
subsidies 
 
While the likelihood of actually completing the above trade liberalization or FTAs within 
a reasonable time horizon differs significantly across scenarios, it is worth examining each 
of them. Scenario 1 is under implementation as ASEAN countries and China signed a 
framework agreement in 2002 to establish the FTA for trade in goods by 2010 for China 
and ASEAN-6 and by 2015 for newer ASEAN member states.11 Scenario 2 that excludes 
sensitive sectors is likely to be realized as ASEAN and Japan signed an agreement on the 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (CEP) in October 2003 and the negotiation is 
expected to be concluded by the end of 2007.12 An FTA between ASEAN and Korea 
(scenario 3), initially limited to trade in goods and excluding some agricultural products 
such as rice, was signed in May 2006. The proposal for China-Japan-Korea FTA (scenario 
4) has been considered by the governments of the three countries (Wong et al., 2004), and 
                                                 
10 Throughout the paper Hong Kong is included in China, as indicated in Table 1. 
11 ASEAN-6 refers to the original ASEAN members; i.e., Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand. Newer ASEAN member states are Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and 
Vietnam. 
12 Yamazawa and Hiratsuka (2003) provides an overview of ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership. 
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a joint research on economic cooperation among these countries has been undertaken by 
the Development Research Center of the State Council of China, the National Institute for 
Research Advancement of Japan, and the Korea Institute for International Economic 
Policy. Although negotiations for an FTA among the economies of ASEAN+3 have not 
yet begun, we include scenario 5 because a number of studies have examined the possible 
effects of such an arrangement (e.g., Brown et al., 2003; Lee and Park, 2005). In addition, 
in May 2007 the ASEAN countries and the EU agreed to start negotiations on a 
comprehensive trade agreement. Finally, we have the global trade liberalization (GTL) 
scenario so that the effects of the FTA scenarios can be compared with those of the global 
scenario. 
In all FTA experiments, we gradually remove bilateral tariffs and export subsidies 
of the relevant sectors among the member countries over the 2007-2012 period. We set the 
elasticity of productivity with respect to openness, ηi, to 0.5 in agricultural sectors and to 
1.0 in all other sectors. We assume that frictional trade costs (e.g. administrative barriers 
and trade-related risk) would be reduced by 2.5 percent in all FTA scenarios and the GTL 
scenario.13 
 
4.   Results 
4.1 Effects on Welfare 
The welfare results for the seven policy scenarios, as deviations in equivalent 
variations (EV) from the baseline in 2015, are summarized in Table 2. The GTL scenario 
(scenario 7) is the most attractive for all countries and regions. To be realistic, however, 
the WTO process is fraught with uncertainty about the scope, depth, and timeliness of 
multilateral commitments to abolish trade barriers. Although the Doha Round started in 
2001, there have been disagreements between developed countries and developing 
countries on a number of issues, particularly on the extent of reductions in agricultural 
subsidies in the United States and the EU and tariff caps. As a result, the negotiations of 
                                                 
13 Keuschnigg and Kohler (2000) and Madsen and Sorensen (2002) use a 5 percent reduction in real 
costs of trade between the EU-15 and Central and East European countries. We use a smaller reduction 
in these costs because the reductions in technical barriers are expected to be negligible for FTAs in East 
Asia as well as for GTL compared with EU enlargement. 
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the current round have been deadlocked a number of times.14 This kind of uncertainty has 
been an important impetus to regional agreements, particularly those between small 
groups of nations who find consensus, implementation and monitoring easier. 
 
Table 2 
Effects on welfare (deviations in equivalent variations from the baseline in 2015) 
    
 Scenario      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Country/region ASEAN- ASEAN- ASEAN- China- ASEAN ASEAN- GTL 
 China Japan Korea Japan-Korea plus 3 EU    
A.  Absolute deviations (US$ billion in 2001 prices) 
China 26.8 -2.9 -2.5 58.7 64.9 -2.3 69.7 
Japan -1.7 19.7 -0.9 29.8 29.7 -0.5 48.2 
Korea -1.1 -0.6 9.1 16.8 16.2 -0.6 23.7 
Taiwan -1.1 -0.7 -0.4 -1.5 -2.6 -0.5 12.1 
ASEAN 27.2 15.3 11.8 -3.8 23.5 9.9 22.6 
Australia/New Zealand -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -0.8 -0.2 11.4 
North America -0.3 -0.9 -0.4 -1.8 -2.8 -0.3 130.8 
Latin America 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -1.1 -1.3 -0.9 36.1 
EU -1.9 -0.8 -0.4 -0.7 -2.5 88.0 76.2 
Rest of the world -1.8 -1.6 -1.6 -2.0 -4.5 -7.1 108.1  
East Asia total 50.0 30.8 17.1 100.0 131.7 6.0 176.3 
World total 45.7 26.8 13.9 93.8 119.7 85.5 538.8 
 
B.  Percent deviations 
China 1.1 -0.1 -0.1 2.4 2.7 -0.1 2.9 
Japan 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.0 1.2 
Korea -0.2 -0.1 1.4 2.5 2.4 -0.1 3.5 
Taiwan -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.1 2.9 
ASEAN 2.8 1.6 1.2 -0.4 2.5 1.0 2.4 
Australia/New Zealand 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 2.3 
North America 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 
Latin America 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 2.2 
EU 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.0 
Rest of the world 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 2.8  
East Asia total 0.6 0.4 0.2 1.2 1.6 0.1 2.1 
World total 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.5    
 
 
In the ASEAN-China FTA (scenario 1), EV of ASEAN increases by 2.8 percent, 
whereas EV of China increases by a smaller percentage (1.1%), compared with the 
baseline values in 2015. This largely results from two factors: (1) the share of ASEAN’s 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Langhammer (2004) for causes and triggers of the setback at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Cancún in September 2003. 
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exports to China is significantly larger than the share of China’s exports to ASEAN, and 
(2) the exports to output ratio is substantially higher for ASEAN countries. The welfare 
effects on non-member countries are negligible except for Korea and Taiwan, which 
experience 0.2 and 0.3 percent declines in their EVs. When ASEAN and Japan form an 
FTA (scenario 2), ASEAN’s EV increases by 1.6 percent while Japan’s EV increases by 
just 0.5 percent in 2015. Welfare of other East Asian countries (China, Korea, and 
Taiwan) declines very slightly. In the ASEAN-Korea FTA (scenario 3), the corresponding 
changes for ASEAN and Korea’s EV are 1.2 and 1.4 percent. 
When a free trade area is formed among China, Japan, and Korea (scenario 4), 
China and Korea are expected to accrue relatively large welfare gains (2.4% and 2.5%, 
respectively) while Japan’s welfare is expected to rise by 0.7 percent. This is largely 
because (1) China has relatively high pre-FTA tariffs, 15  and (2) Korea will have 
preferential accesses to the large Chinese and Japanese markets and its exports to China 
and Japan, which already constitute large shares of Korea’s total exports, will increase 
dramatically. Under the trilateral FTA, China, Korea and Japan respectively obtain 84, 71 
and 62 percent of the GTL’s benefits. Thus, the China-Japan-Korea FTA could be a very 
attractive stepping stone to globalization for the three countries although large political 
obstacles must be surmounted to achieve such an FTA. 
Under the ASEAN+3 FTA scenario (scenario 5), the welfare of all members 
increases although the welfare gain for Japan and Korea are somewhat smaller than under 
the trilateral FTA. These small losses are more than offset by the ASEAN and China’s 
gains and East Asia as a whole is expected to gain $131.7 billion (1.6%) in 2015, 
compared with its $176.3 billion (2.1%) gain under the GTL. In other words, East Asia 
will be able to attain three-quarters of GTL’s benefits from the ASEAN+3 FTA. 
If free trade between ASEAN and the EU is realized (scenario 6), ASEAN is 
expected to realize a 1.0 percent gain in its welfare, which is surprisingly smaller than the 
gain expected from an FTA with China, Japan, or Korea. The EU’s welfare is predicted to 
increase by 1.1 percent. One of the reasons for a relatively small welfare gain for ASEAN 
is that its trade with East Asian countries, particularly with China, is projected to grow 
                                                 
15 The countries with high pre-FTA tariffs generally gain proportionally more than those with low 
tariffs because of larger gains to their consumers resulting from greater reductions in import prices. 
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significantly faster than that with the EU during the simulation period. For example, by 
2015 ASEAN’s exports are predicted to increase by $81 billion under the ASEAN-China 
FTA scenario, but they are predicted to increase by only $40 billion under the ASEAN-EU 
FTA scenario (compared with the baseline exports for ASEAN). 
 
4.2 Effects on Sectoral Output 
 
While the aggregate welfare and trade results are of interest in themselves, the 
most useful results are at the industry level, where structural adjustments and resource 
reallocations occur in response to policy changes. Because sectoral interests can exert 
significant influence on policy negotiations, the sectoral results would be most important 
for political economy considerations. In this section we examine the effects of alternative 
policy scenarios on sectoral output. 
Tables 3-6 summarize output adjustments for the 26 sectors in China, Japan, Korea 
and ASEAN countries under the policy scenarios in which each country/region is a 
participant. Sectoral adjustments are expressed in percent deviations from the baseline for 
the year 2015. They are large in most of the agricultural and food sectors for East Asia in 
general and Japan and Korea in particular because of high trade barriers in these two 
countries. 
China’s agricultural and food sectors expand under the China-Japan-Korea FTA 
and ASEAN+3 FTA scenarios (Table 3). In particular, the percentage increases in output 
of other crops are over 150 percent relative to the baseline in 2015 under these two 
scenarios although in absolute values, these increases are smaller than rice, other grains, 
vegetables and fruits, and food products. 
Among the manufacturing sectors, output of other transportation equipment 
increases 15-16 percent when the ASEAN countries are included in the FTA. Output of 
the apparel and leather sectors increases moderately when Japan is an FTA member, but 
the increase is small relative to the GTL scenario because China’s exports of these 
products to North American and the EU are much larger. The motor vehicle sector 
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contracts when Japan and Korea are FTA members, but the extent of contraction is 
relatively small compared with the GTL scenario.16 
 
Table 3 
China’s sectoral output adjustments under alternative scenarios  
(percent deviations from the baseline for the year 2015) 
    
 Scenario      
 (1) (4) (5) (7) 
Commodity/sector ASEAN- China- ASEAN GTL 
 China Japan-Korea plus 3    
Rice 0.4 26.7 19.8 17.1 
Other grains 0.3 27.0 26.7 -50.9 
Vegetables and fruits 0.2 5.5 5.3 4.9 
Other crops -0.2 156.9 157.6 2.4 
Livestock 0.8 3.1 3.3 5.4 
Natural resources -0.4 -0.9 -1.1 -2.5 
Fossil fuel 0.3 0.2 0.4 -4.4 
Food products 1.4 7.0 7.3 3.9 
Textiles 0.9 -0.6 -0.2 11.4 
Apparel -0.2 5.0 3.9 20.7 
Leather 2.4 1.4 3.0 17.9 
Wood products -1.5 0.8 -0.7 1.9 
Paper products 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 
Petroleum products 2.4 -1.0 1.2 -3.2 
Chemical products -2.2 -0.9 -2.7 -3.1 
Mineral products 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 0.1 
Iron and steel 0.7 -2.0 -1.4 -3.5 
Nonferrous metal 0.1 -2.1 -2.0 -6.5 
Metal products 0.3 -0.7 -0.5 1.8 
Machinery 0.4 -1.2 -1.0 -2.6 
Electronic equipment 2.0 1.2 1.9 0.9 
Motor vehicles 2.0 -4.4 -4.8 -13.9 
Other transport equip. 16.0 0.3 15.3 13.9 
Other manufactures -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 0.0 
Trade and transport 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Services 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2    
 
 
Japan’s rice sector contracts significantly under all four scenarios (Table 4). The 
contractions of other agricultural and food products, particularly other grains, are much 
smaller under the three FTA scenarios than under the GTL scenario. Under the China-
Japan-Korea FTA and ASEAN+3 FTA scenarios, Japan’s textile sector expands by 19-21 
                                                 
16  Under the China-Japan-Korea FTA and ASEAN+3 FTA scenarios, large increases in China’s 
imports of motor vehicles from Japan and Korea are partially offset by reductions in its imports from 
North America and the EU. 
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percent, largely driven by sharp increases in its exports to China. By contrast, the apparel 
and leather sectors respectively contract by 7-8 percent and 13-15 percent, caused by large 
increases in its imports from China and to a much lesser extent from increases in its 
imports from other member countries. Under the ASEAN+3 FTA scenario, output of steel 
increases by 4 percent, about the same percentage increase as the GTL scenario largely 
because about three-quarters of Japan’s steel exports are shipped to other East Asian 
countries. 
 
Table 4 
Japan’s sectoral output adjustments under alternative scenarios  
(percent deviations from the baseline for the year 2015) 
    
 Scenario      
 (2) (4) (5) (7) 
Commodity/sector ASEAN- China- ASEAN GTL 
 Japan Japan-Korea plus 3    
Rice -53.2 -58.0 -58.5 -65.7 
Other grains 0.8 -33.0 -34.1 -87.3 
Vegetables and fruits 0.5 -0.1 -0.8 -5.6 
Other crops 0.3 -2.1 -2.7 -5.8 
Livestock -0.9 2.5 0.8 -6.4 
Natural resources -0.2 -1.0 -0.2 -0.2 
Fossil fuel -2.2 -3.7 -3.8 -7.9 
Food products -2.4 -0.5 -2.9 -14.5 
Textiles 2.9 20.6 18.8 10.2 
Apparel -0.7 -7.8 -7.4 -7.1 
Leather -3.8 -12.7 -14.8 -22.0 
Wood products -1.1 -2.6 -2.2 -0.9 
Paper products 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 
Petroleum products 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -3.5 
Chemical products 0.6 1.9 1.4 1.1 
Mineral products 0.5 2.3 2.5 2.3 
Iron and steel 3.1 1.6 4.0 3.9 
Nonferrous metal 1.3 1.8 2.9 -0.9 
Metal products 1.1 0.3 1.2 1.8 
Machinery -0.1 2.5 2.2 0.9 
Electronic equipment -0.8 -1.4 -2.5 -0.7 
Motor vehicles 4.4 -1.3 2.2 14.0 
Other transport equip. 0.8 -3.5 -5.0 7.6 
Other manufactures 0.7 -0.7 0.2 0.1 
Trade and transport 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.4 
Services 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4    
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A small contraction in Japan’s motor vehicle industry under the China-Japan-
Korea FTA scenario needs to be interpreted with caution. Large increases in its exports to 
China and Korea increase the price of Japanese automobiles in our model, reducing its 
exports to nonmember countries as well as the domestic demand. However, in practice the 
automakers are unlikely to raise the price at least in the short run because they usually try 
to maintain the market shares. Thus, output of motor vehicles in Japan is likely to increase 
even under this scenario. 
 
Table 5 
Korea’s sectoral output adjustments under alternative scenarios  
(percent deviations from the baseline for the year 2015) 
    
 Scenario      
 (3) (4) (5) (7) 
Commodity/sector ASEAN- China- ASEAN GTL 
 Korea Japan-Korea plus 3    
Rice -41.0 -54.8 -55.1 -55.7 
Other grains -19.7 -47.3 -49.8 -91.9 
Vegetables and fruits 4.5 -20.0 -19.7 -17.3 
Other crops  7.5 -30.9 -30.2 -68.4 
Livestock 20.0 36.7 35.0 31.1 
Natural resources -4.2 -8.1 -7.9 -14.8 
Fossil fuel -2.9 -0.3 -1.9 -14.4 
Food products 14.6 22.5 20.8 16.1 
Textiles 5.6 21.0 23.0 25.8 
Apparel -1.4 5.0 5.6 4.6 
Leather 25.5 100.2 90.4 68.4 
Wood products -5.7 -3.3 -5.9 -4.3 
Paper products -2.0 1.6 0.6 -3.6 
Petroleum products 2.8 17.0 14.0 17.6 
Chemical products -0.8 6.1 2.1 -1.8 
Mineral products -2.6 -1.4 -2.1 -7.5 
Iron and steel 0.3 -3.7 -2.3 -5.7 
Nonferrous metal 0.3 -1.4 0.6 -10.3 
Metal products -0.4 -1.8 -1.6 -2.4 
Machinery -3.3 -4.9 -5.1 -8.3 
Electronic equipment -3.8 -0.6 -2.7 -3.4 
Motor vehicles 21.3 -1.1 11.7 30.0 
Other transport equip. 6.4 -12.2 -15.5 22.3 
Other manufactures 2.7 10.5 12.7 2.8 
Trade and transport 0.7 1.0 1.1 3.0 
Services -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2     
 
Like Japan, Korea will experience large output adjustments in the agricultural 
sectors under all four scenarios (Table 5). In particular, output of other gains (mainly 
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wheat) is predicted to contract by almost 70 percent. Production of rice is also expected to 
fall by 41-56 percent, and output of vegetables and fruits and other crops will contract 
significantly under the China-Japan-Korea FTA, ASEAN+3 FTA, and GTL scenarios.17 
Among the manufacturing sectors, output of textiles, leather, petroleum products, 
and other manufactures would increase. Although the motor vehicle industry would 
expand under the ASEAN-Korea FTA and GTL scenarios, it is expected to contract under 
the China-Japan-Korea FTA and ASEAN+3 FTA scenarios largely because Korea’s 
imports of motor vehicles from Japan increase substantially. 
Under the FTA scenarios in which ASEAN countries are members, the sectoral 
adjustments differ significantly across the scenarios (Table 6). For example, the textile, 
apparel, and leather industries expand by 13-29 percent under the ASEAN-EU FTA 
scenario, whereas these industries either increase only slightly or contract in the other four 
FTA scenarios. This is mainly because ASEAN countries have comparative advantage in 
these products over the EU, but not over China. In addition, the protection rates on these 
products in ASEAN were high relative to those in Japan and Korea in the base year (2001). 
Output of chemicals and machinery expands substantially when China is a member 
of the FTA, and output of motor vehicles and parts contracts noticeably in all scenarios 
except the ASEAN-China FTA case.  
 
                                                 
17 In practice, however, Japan and Korea are extremely unlikely to remove tariffs on imports of rice, 
wheat, and a number of other agricultural products. Thus, the magnitudes of sectoral adjustments are 
expected to be smaller than those reported in Tables 3-6. Lee et al. (2004) provide several FTA 
scenarios where trade barriers on agricultural products and processed food are assumed to remain fixed. 
They confirm that welfare gains to the FTA member countries become significantly smaller in the absence 
of agricultural liberalization. 
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Table 6 
ASEAN’s sectoral output adjustments under alternative scenarios  
(percent deviations from the baseline for the year 2015) 
    
 Scenario      
 (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) 
Commodity/sector ASEAN- ASEAN- ASEAN- ASEAN ASEAN- GTL 
 China Japan Korea plus 3 EU    
Rice -1.2 24.7 7.1 7.1 7.5 13.9 
Other grains -10.5 -0.5  30.1 -2.6 -5.4 -16.2 
Vegetables and fruits 6.7 -3.5 -3.8 3.6 -3.1 3.6 
Other crops 11.1 9.3 9.1 9.4 13.4 -2.2 
Livestock 1.6 4.4 0.9 3.9 3.2 9.7 
Natural resources -5.0 -3.3 -2.3 -3.8 -4.7 -8.2 
Fossil fuel -3.7 -1.5 -0.2 -2.1 -3.5 -6.0 
Food products 3.0 11.7 3.9 9.3 7.4 21.1 
Textiles -0.8 0.3 0.6 -4.8 13.0 6.5 
Apparel -1.1 3.3 1.9 2.3 15.3 24.3 
Leather -9.7 0.9 -2.8 -8.2 29.0 7.5 
Wood products -7.1 -1.6 -2.8 -2.2 -4.6 -5.0 
Paper products -1.3 -2.1 -0.6 -2.2 -3.2 -3.4 
Petroleum products 2.0 0.9 0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 
Chemical products 22.8 -0.8 2.1 17.7 0.2 12.0 
Mineral products 0.8 -2.4 0.9 -0.8 -2.4 -1.7 
Iron and steel 0.9 -7.4 -0.2 -7.2 -4.1 -10.8 
Nonferrous metal -3.2 -3.6 -1.4 -4.0 -7.0 -13.7 
Metal products 0.4 -0.6 1.9 -1.6 -1.4 -3.8 
Machinery 11.2 4.6 5.4 10.8 0.6 5.1 
Electronic equipment 1.4 -0.5 -0.7 1.7 -4.1 -4.9 
Motor vehicles 9.2 -13.7 -7.9 -18.4 -6.0 -20.4 
Other transport equip. -8.2 11.3 12.4 -6.0 12.0 -9.3 
Other manufactures -3.8 -1.4 -0.8 -3.2 -0.6 -7.8 
Trade and transport -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 
Services -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7    
 
 
4.3 Changes in the Pattern of Trade 
 
In this section we examine the effects of alternative FTA scenarios on the pattern 
of East Asian trade. Specifically, we compute the indices of revealed comparative advantage 
(RCA), developed by Balassa (1965), and correlate RCA rankings of commodities with 
various FTA scenarios and those with the global trade liberalization scenario to examine how 
“natural” the groupings would be. 
RCA is defined as 
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where Er,i is country (region) r’s exports of commodity i. In other words, RCA is defined 
as the share of commodity i in country r’s total exports relative to the commodity’s share 
in total world exports. When the RCA index is greater than one, commodity i is more 
important in country r’s exports than it is in total world exports, implying that the country 
has a comparative advantage in the commodity. 
 
Table 7 
Revealed comparative advantage indices for China, Japan, Korea and ASEAN in 2001 
    
Commodity/sector China Japan Korea ASEAN    
Rice 1.21 1.87 0.09 4.48 
Other grains 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.06 
Vegetables and fruits 0.65 0.01 0.23 0.66 
Other crops 0.46 0.04 0.17 1.53 
Livestock 1.05 0.09 0.08 0.35 
Natural resources 0.35 0.05 0.04 1.39 
Fossil fuel 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.87 
Food products 0.44 0.12 0.26 1.18 
Textiles 1.94 0.72 2.69 0.97 
Apparel 3.77 0.05 0.84 1.49 
Leather 5.20 0.05 0.99 1.44 
Wood products 1.46 0.06 0.12 1.69 
Paper products 0.40 0.27 0.57 0.64 
Petroleum products 0.47 0.15 1.72 1.01 
Chemical products 0.52 0.91 1.01 0.69 
Mineral products 1.12 0.97 0.54 0.69 
Iron and steel 0.32 1.58 1.61 0.27 
Nonferrous metal 0.39 0.59 0.69 0.55 
Metal products 1.37 0.75 0.98 0.45 
Machinery 0.86 1.76 0.78 0.58 
Electronic equipment 1.26 1.76 2.39 3.07 
Motor vehicles 0.07 2.33 1.15 0.11 
Other transport equip. 0.42 1.25 1.83 0.24 
Other manufactures 3.43 0.71 0.58 0.75 
Trade and transport 2.17 0.56 0.55 0.80 
Services 0.46 0.43 0.56 0.77    
Source: GTAP database, version 6. 
 
 
Table 7 provides the RCA indices for the 26 sectors in China, Japan, Korea and 
ASEAN in 2001. In general, the larger the RCA index for a given commodity, the higher 
is the ranking of the product by comparative advantage (Kreinin and Plummer, 1994a,b). 
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However, the RCA index may be distorted by tariffs, nontariff barriers, subsidies and 
other policies. For example, RCA in Japan’s rice sector is equal to 1.87, but this number is 
highly distorted because rice is one of the least competitive sectors in Japan. 
In China the commodities/sectors with the five highest RCA index values in 2001 
are leather (5.20), apparel (3.77), other manufactures (3.43), trade and transport (2.17), 
and textiles (1.94). In Japan they are motor vehicles (2.33), machinery (1.76), electronic 
equipment (1.76), iron and steel (1.58), and other transport equipment (1.25). In Korea the 
commodities with high RCA rankings are textiles (2.69), electronic equipment (2.39), 
other transport equipment (1.83), petroleum products (1.72), and iron and steel (1.61), 
whereas in ASEAN they are rice (4.48), electronic equipment (3.07), wood products (1.69), 
other crops (1.53), apparel (1.49), and leather (1.44).  
To examine how “natural” each FTA grouping might be, we first compute the RCA 
indices under the GTL scenario for the year 2015. Second, we calculate the RCA indices 
for each member country of FTA with respect to the bloc it joins, rather than the world as 
a whole, for the six FTA scenarios in 2015. Third, we compute the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients for China, Japan, Korea, ASEAN and the EU between each FTA 
scenario and the GTL scenario in 2015.18 The results are summarized in Table 8. It should 
be noted that our definition of natural trading bloc is one where each member country has a 
relatively high Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the particular trading bloc 
and global trade liberalization. This should contrasted with a more conventional definition 
of natural trading partners where a pair of countries have similar size, GDP per capita, are 
neighboring, and share a common border and/or a common language (e.g., Frankel et al., 
1995). 
For China and ASEAN the correlation coefficients of RCA rankings between any 
particular FTA and GTL differ considerably across the FTA scenarios. On the contrary, 
for Japan and Korea the coefficients are 0.83-0.91 and 0.71-0.85, respectively, suggesting 
that RCA rankings between any given FTA and GTL are similar for the two countries. For 
example, for Japan motor vehicles, machinery, and iron and steel are ranked in the top 3,  
                                                 
18 We also computed the Spearman rank correlation coefficients between each FTA scenario and the 
baseline scenario in 2015 for these countries, but the results were qualitatively similar. This is because 
we assume partial trade liberalization on imports of all products from all trading partners in the baseline. 
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while agricultural products and fossil fuel are ranked at or near the bottom of the rankings, 
under all three FTA scenarios in which Japan is a member as well as under GTL. By 
contrast, China has a very low coefficient between the China-Japan-Korea FTA and GTL. 
This is mainly caused by large increases in China’s exports of other grains, other crops 
and fossil fuel to Japan and Korea, thereby significantly raising its RCA rankings of these 
commodities with respect to the trilateral bloc. However, China’s RCA indices of these 
commodities under GTL are at the bottom of the rankings. Thus, for China large increases 
in exports of agricultural products and energy under the China-Japan-Korea FTA are 
undesirable because they result in sectoral adjustments that are quite different from those 
expected from GTL. 
 
Table 8 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients between each FTA scenario  
and global trade liberalization in 2015 
    
 Scenario      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Country/region ASEAN- ASEAN- ASEAN- China- ASEAN ASEAN- 
 China Japan Korea Japan-Korea plus 3 EU    
China 0.60 –   –   0.04 0.54 –   
Japan –   0.91 –   0.83 0.86 –   
Korea –   –   0.85 0.71 0.82 –   
ASEAN 0.24 0.45 0.21 –   0.41 0.77 
EU –   –   –   –   –   0.56    
 
ASEAN has low Spearman correlation coefficients between the FTA with either 
China or Korea and GTL for two important reasons. First, electronic equipment has the 
highest RCA index among all commodity groups in ASEAN under GTL. However, its 
RCA ranking falls to 10-15th in the ASEAN-China and ASEAN-Korea FTA scenarios. 
Second, apparel and leather’s RCA indices are near the top of the rankings under GTL, but 
their rankings fall significantly under the bilateral FTA with China or Korea. 
Kreinin and Plummer (1994b) suggest that a natural FTA is one in which the 
Spearman correlation coefficients are high for all member countries. Among the six FTA 
scenarios considered in this study, the ASEAN-EU FTA may be considered relatively 
natural as the Spearman correlation coefficients are greater than 0.5 for both ASEAN and 
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the EU. Among the five alternative East Asian FTAs, the ASEAN-Japan and the 
ASEAN+3 FTAs cause relatively small adjustments in the rankings of industries 
compared with the rankings of industries under GTL. 
 
5.   Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have examined the effects of alternative FTA scenarios in East 
Asia on sectoral adjustments and the pattern of trade. Our findings indicate that the China-
Japan-Korea FTA and the ASEAN+3 FTA would bring about relatively large welfare 
gains to all member countries. However, a tradeoff exists between welfare gains and costs 
associated with structural adjustments. For China, a low Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient between the China-Japan-Korea FTA and global trade liberalization suggests 
that it would need to undergo considerable structural adjustments under the trilateral FTA. 
The average correlation coefficient of the member countries’ RCA rankings between a 
particular FTA and GTL is significantly greater for the ASEAN-Japan and the ASEAN+3 
FTAs. Thus, it appears that the ASEAN+3 FTA would be the most attractive FTA among 
the alternative FTAs considered in this study, with relatively large welfare gains and small 
structural adjustments. 
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Appendix: Model Equations 
 
 
A.1. The Neo-Classical Model in Comparative Static Mode 
 
In the equations describing the model specification, the following indices are 
frequently employed. In general, the regional and time indices are omitted unless needed 
for clarification. The base sectoral, labor and regional indices are specific to the GTAP 
data set. The other indices are specific to the model specification.  
 
i Sectoral index j is used as an alias for i.  
ll Labor skill (representing skilled, unskilled, and highly skilled labor). 
l A subset of ll, which excludes highly skilled labor. 
f An index for other domestic final demand agents (government and investment). 
r Regional index. r' is used as an alias for r. 
v Capital vintage. 
t time index. 
 
Other labels for important subsets of sectors are the following: 
    
 Index Subset label Description    
 i cr  Crops sectors (user-determined) 
 i lv  Livestock sectors (user-determined)  
 i ag  Agricultural sectors (the union of the crop and livestock sectors)  
 i ip  Non-agricultural products (user-determined) 
 i e  Energy sectors (user-determined) 
 i ft  Fertilizer sectors (user-determined) 
 i fd  Feed sectors (user-determined) 
 i ik  Sectors including in the calibrating productivity (user-determined) 
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Trade 
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Other Equations and Definitions 
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A.2. Model Dynamics 
 
 
Endogenous Dynamic Equations 
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Exogenous Dynamic Equations 
 
(161) ( ) ntnPopt PopgPop −+= 1  
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A.3  Definitions of Variables 
 
 
Production Variables 
 
Crops 
 
 ND Demand for aggregate non-energy non-fertilizer intermediate demand r x cr 
 VA Demand for value added+energy+ fertilizer bundle r x cr x v 
 PXv Unit cost of production by vintage r x cr x v 
 PX Average unit cost of production r x cr 
 PP Producer price r x cr 
 
 AL Demand for aggregate labor (x/ ‘highly skilled’) r x cr 
 HKTEF Demand for capital+energy+fertilizer+land bundle r x cr x v 
 PVA Price of value added+energy+fertilizer bundle r x cr x v 
 
 Ld Demand for labor (x/ ‘highly skilled’) r x cr x l 
 AW Aggregate sectoral wage (x/ ‘highly skilled’) r x cr 
 
 HKTE Demand for capital+energy+land bundle r x cr x v 
 Fert Demand for fertilizer r x cr 
 PHKTEF Price of capital+energy+fertilizer+land bundle r x cr x v 
 
 XEp Demand for aggregate energy bundle r x cr x v 
 HKT Demand for bundle of capital plus land r x cr x v 
 PHKTE Price of capital+energy+land bundle r x cr x v 
 
 LHsk Demand ‘highly’ skilled labor r x cr 
 KT Demand for bundle of capital plus land r x cr x v 
 PHKT Price of capital (human and physical)+land bundle r x cr x v 
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 Td Demand for land r x cr 
 Fd Demand for sector-specific factor r x cr 
 Kvd Demand for capital (by vintage) r x cr x v 
 PKT Price for bundle of capital plus land r x cr x v 
 
 XAp Demand for (Armington) intermediate goods r x cr x j 
 PND Price of aggregate non-energy intermediate goods r x cr 
 PEp Price of aggregate energy bundle r x cr x v 
 Pfert Price for fertilizer r x cr 
 
Livestock 
 
 ND Demand for aggregate non-energy non-feed intermediate demand r x lv 
 VA Demand for value added+energy+feed bundle r x lv x v 
 PXv Unit cost of production by vintage r x lv x v 
 PX Average unit cost of production r x lv 
 PP Producer price r x lv 
 
 TFD Demand for land-feed bundle r x lv x v 
 KTEL Demand for capital-energy-labor composite good r x lv x v 
 PVA Price of value added+energy+feed bundle r x lv x v 
 
 Td Demand for land r x lv 
 Feed Demand for feed r x lv 
 PTFD Price of land feed bundle r x lv x v 
  
 AL Demand for aggregate labor (x/ ‘highly’ skilled) r x lv  
 HKTE Demand for capital-energy bundle r x lv x v 
 PKTEL Price of labor-capital-energy bundle r x lv x v 
  
 Ld Demand for labor by skill (x/ ‘highly’ skilled) r x lv x l 
 AW Aggregate sectoral wage (x/ ‘highly’ skilled) r x lv 
  
 XEp Demand for aggregate energy bundle r x lv x v 
 HKT Demand for bundle of capital and other factors r x lv x v 
 PHKTE Price of capital+energy bundle r x lv x v 
 
 LHsk Demand ‘highly’ skilled labor r x lv  
 KT Demand for bundle of capital plus other factors r x lv x v 
 PHKT Price of capital (human and physical)+other bundle r x lv x v 
 
 Fd Demand for sector-specific factor r x lv  
 Kvd Demand for capital (by vintage) r x lv x v 
 PKT Price for bundle of capital plus land r x lv x v 
 
 XAp Demand for (Armington) intermediate goods r x lv x j 
 PND Price of aggregate non-energy intermediate goods r x lv 
 PEp Price of aggregate energy bundle r x lv x v 
 Pfeed Price of feed r x lv 
 
Non-agricultural sectors 
 
 ND Demand for aggregate non-energy intermediate demand r x ip 
 VA Demand for value added+energy bundle r x ip x v 
 PXv Unit cost of production by vintage r x ip x v 
 PX Average unit cost of production r x ip 
 PP Producer price r x ip 
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 AL Demand for aggregate labor (x/ ‘highly’ skilled) r x ip 
 HKTE Demand for capital+energy bundle r x ip x v 
 PVA Price of value added+energy bundle r x ip x v 
 
 Ld Demand for labor by skill (x/ ‘highly’ skilled) r x ip x l 
 AW Aggregate sectoral wage (x/ ‘highly’ skilled) r x ip 
  
 XEp Demand for aggregate energy bundle r x ip x v 
 HKT Demand for bundle of capital plus other resources r x ip x v 
 PHKTE Price of capital+energy bundle r x ip x v 
 
 LHsk Demand ‘highly’ skilled labor r x ip  
 KT Demand for bundle of capital plus other factors r x ip x v 
 PHKT Price of capital (human and physical)+other bundle r x ip x v 
 
 Td Demand for land r x ip 
 Fd Demand for sector-specific resources r x ip 
 Kvd Demand for capital (by vintage) r x ip x v 
 PKT Price for bundle of capital plus other resources r x ip x v 
 
 XAp Demand for (Armington) intermediate goods r x ip x j 
 PND Price of aggregate non-energy intermediate goods r x ip 
 PEp Price of aggregate energy bundle r x ip x v 
 
Income Variables 
 
 TY Aggregate land remuneration r 
 FY Aggregate sector-specific factor remuneration r 
 LY Aggregate labor remuneration (by skill) r x ll 
 KY Aggregate capital remuneration r 
 YH Gross household income r x h 
 DY Depreciation allowance r x h 
 Yd Disposable household income r x h 
 
Final Demand Variables 
 
 Y* Supernumerary income r x h 
 XAc Household (Armington) demand for goods and services r x i x h 
 Sh Household saving r x h 
 CPI Consumer price index r x h 
 
 XAf Other final (Armington) demand for goods and services r x i x f 
 PFD Aggregate price index for other final demand r x f 
 
Trade Variables 
 
 XA Aggregate Armington demand r x i 
 XD Domestic demand for domestic productiona r x i 
 XMT Domestic demand for aggregate imports r x i 
 PA Armington price r x i 
 
 WTF Trade flow matrixb r x r x i 
 PMT Price of aggregate imports r x i 
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 PD Price of domestic goods sold locally r x i 
 ES Aggregate supply of exports r x i 
 XP Aggregate domestic output r x i 
 
 WPE Determination of bilateral (world) export prices r x r x i 
 PPE Price of aggregate exports r x i 
 
 WXMg Volume of world demand for international trade and transport services 1 
 AXMg Regional supply of international trade and transport services r 
 WPMg Aggregate world price of international trade and transport services 1 
 XMg Regional sectoral demand for goods and services related to trade r x i 
 APMg Regional supply price of international trade and transport services r 
 
Domestic Closure Variables 
 
 YG Aggregate government revenue r 
 Sg Government saving (or deficit) r 
 RSg Real government saving (or deficit) r 
 FDGov Aggregate volume of government expenditures on goods and services r 
 
 FDInv Aggregate volume of investment expenditures on goods and servicesc r-1 
 P Price index of OECD exports 1 
 
Factor Market Variables 
 
 Ls Aggregate labor supply r x ll 
 TW Economy-wide equilibrium wage r x ll  
 W Sector-specific wage r x ll x i 
 NW After tax wage r x ll x i 
 
 TLnd Aggregate land supply r 
 PTLnd Economy-wide land price r 
 Ts Sectoral land supply r x i 
 PT Sectoral-specific land price r x i 
 NPT After tax land price r x i 
 
 Fs Supply of sector-specific factors r x i 
 PF Price of sector-specific factor r x i 
 
 KSs Supply of sectoral capitald r x i 
 TR Economy-wide rental rate r 
 R Sector and vintage specific rental rate r x i x v 
 NR Sector and vintage specific rental rate after tax r x i x v 
 RR Relative price of Old to New capitale r x i 
 
 χv Capital-output ratiof r x i  
 XPv Output by vintage r x i x v 
 
 γI Rate of real investment growth r 
 K Aggregate capital stock (non-normalized) r 
 Ks Aggregate capital stock (normalized) r 
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Other Variables 
 
 RGDPMP Real GDP at market price r 
 RGDP Real GDP at factor cost r 
 PGDP GDP deflator (at factor cost) r 
 PABS Price index of aggregate domestic absorption r 
 
 gy Growth rate of real GDP (at factor cost)g r 
 λl Labor productivity factor r x ll x ik 
 χp Trade-sensitive productivity shifter r x i  
 φp Productivity shifter calibration parameterh r x ik 
 
 λl Exogenous labor productivity factor r x ll x ink 
 λk Exogenous capital productivity factor r x ink x v 
 λt Exogenous land productivity factor r x ink 
 λf Exogenous sector-specific factor productivity factor r x ink 
 
 
 
